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ARGUMENT
A.

The district court abused its discretion in denying the Campbells' motion for

reconsideration.
Decidedly producing vast amounts of argument in their Respondent's Brief, the
Kvammes fail to address directly the issue raised on appeal. Shortened to its pertinent point,
the Kvammes' position is stated in paragraph 3 on page 36 of their brief, "They [Rules
1l(a)(2)(B) and 60(b)(2)] are both subject to the same standard-that is, both I.R.C.P.
l l(a)(2)(B) and I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) are discretionary, not mandatory." (Emphasis original.)
Thus, while accurately identifying that both motions are addressed to the discretion of
the district court, the Kvammes overlook the Cambpells' argument on the crucial and
differing standards the district court must apply when considering motions under those
separate rules.
Unquestionably, the Campells timely filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule
1 l(a)(2)(B).
The standard applicable to the exercise of the district court's discretion on a motion
for reconsideration is as follows. When faced with a motion for reconsideration, the district
court must consider additional information in the form of admissible testimony in an
affidavit; the district court does not have discretion to ignore such positive testimony. KeplerFleenor v. Fremont County, 268 P.3d 1159, 152 Idaho 207 (2012); PHH Mortg. Services
Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635-636, 200 P .3d 1180, 1184-1185 (2009).
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"Whether or not the district court erred in refusing to consider the new
evidence depends upon what the Perreiras wanted the district court to
reconsider. The trial court must consider new evidence that bears on the
correctness of an interlocutory order if requested to do so by a timely motion
under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure."
PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho at 635, 200 P.3d at 1184 (2009)(emphasis
added).
Once the court actually considers any new evidence on a motion for reconsideration,
it then applies its discretion to determine whether that evidence would alter or change the
judgment entered. If so, the court should exercise its discretion in granting relief. If not, the
court may exercise its discretion denying relief.
Based upon the district court's colloquy at the time of hearing the Campbells' motion
for reconsideration as to its obligation to consider the additional evidence, together with the
language in its subsequent order denying the Campbells' motion, it is clear the court applied
the wrong standard. Application of the wrong standard constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941P.2d314 (1997).
Summary judgment was granted to the Kvammes due to the lack of foundation for a
record of survey. The affidavit of Kevin Thompson provided the necessary foundation for
admissibility of the record of survey and added further factual information pertinent to the
issues on summary judgment. Such evidence would unquestionably alter or change the
summary judgment entered in favor of the Kvammes.
Furthermore, the district court in its memorandum decision and order, determined that
the affidavit of Thompson would not be considered because "the evidence is not new ... " and
it "should have been submitted months ago." (Clerk's Record, Vol. IV, p. 773). Again, that is
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not the standard a district court applies to a motion for reconsideration. That is the type of
standard applied to the "newly discovered evidence" provision of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2).
In PHH v. Perreira, the Idaho Supreme Court noted the difference in stating, "the
trial court cannot consider new evidence when asked to reconsider a final judgment pursuant
to a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), id., or pursuant to a motion to
amend findings of fact or conclusions oflaw under Rule 52(b)." Id.
The district court determined the affidavit of Thompson was not "new" in the sense of
newly discovered. A fact emphasized by the court where it stated the evidence should have
been produced earlier. In short, the new evidence submitted by the Camp bells as part of their
motion for reconsideration was simply not considered by the district court.
Failure to apply the correct legal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. The
district court erred in denying the Campbells' motion for reconsideration.

B.

"Right result, wrong theory" rule does not apply.
On cross-appeal, the Kvammes contend the district court made the correct decision to

grant summary judgment in their favor albeit on a wrong theory. However, the record on
appeal discloses the unmistakable fact that the district court did not make any factual
determinations concerning the competing theories; rather, the court simply reached a
conclusion that the Campbells had failed to provide the foundation necessary to render a
record of survey admissible for purposes of summary judgment. Consequently, there is
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nothing in the record on appeal giving the appellate court the required factual determinations
to allow it to act as a trial court and decide whether the Kvammes' theories can be supported.
This Court has generally held that where an order of a lower court is correct
but is based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the
correct theory. We therefore review the theories advanced by seller in order to
determine if they provide a basis for upholding the trial court's granting of
partial summary judgment. The trial court, however, made no finding on
whether the order form was intended as a fully integrated agreement. The
trial court is the appropriate forum for such a determination and as such the
trial court should be given the opportunity on remand to make such a
determination.
Anderson & Naftiger v. G. T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 180, 595 P.2d 709, 714
(1979)(emphasis added).
The district court's judgment arose from cross-motions for summary judgment. The
Campbells filed their motion supported by affidavit and deposition testimony. Then, the
Kvammes presented affidavits challenging the Campbells' motion and on their own moved
for summary judgment on their claims. The record before the district court contained
volumes of affidavits, deposition testimony, and counter affidavits all containing various
disputes of fact. Viewed dispassionately, the evidence presented on summary judgment
shows genuine issues of fact pertaining to the fence line in question and its history of use.
The district court made no determinations of those disputed facts. Rather, the district court
simply did not address the substance of either party's motion when it ruled that the record of
survey lacked foundation.
Moreover, the doctrine of "right result-wrong theory" does not apply to the issue of
abuse of discretion as raised by the Camp bells.
The petitioners' alternative argument, that we should uphold the court's order
under Rule 41 (b), misapplies the "right result-wrong theory" doctrine. This
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doctrine does not apply to issues of discretion. It applies only to issues where
an alternative rule of law can be applied to a given body of facts, yielding the
same legally correct answer. Where an issue is one of discretion, there is no
single, legally "correct" answer. Standards of Appellate Review § 3 .4,
IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK (Idaho Law Foundation, 1985). The
proper appellate response, when an exercise of discretion is tainted by legal
error, is not to usurp such discretion ourselves but to set aside the lower
court's ruling and to remand the case. Id.
Agrodyne, Inc. v. Beard, 114 Idaho 342, 348, 757 P.2d 205, 211 (Ct. App. 1988).

The Campbells appealed from the denial of their motion for reconsideration and the
court's preceding summary judgment. As in Agrodyne, the issue on appeal in this matter is
whether the district abused its discretion. Consequently, the rule of right result-wrong theory
has no application.
Adverse Possession

The strength of the K vammes' position on their claim for adverse possession rests
entirely on the as yet unmade judicial determination of whether Thompson's record of survey
was performed in accordance with survey standards. The Kvammes have not presented any
other survey to the district court on which they base their claims. In short, the Kvammes
contend that they have paid taxes on all land extending north of the disputed fence line. Their
contention is grounded upon their theory that the north half of the section is, in fact, the fence
line. That contention is refuted by Thompson's survey and his affidavit.
As shown by the transcript of the hearing on the cross-motions for summary
judgment, the Kvammes hotly challenged the district court's observation from the bench that
the Kvammes' theory about a "nominal section" measurement did not square with the court's
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understanding of standard survey practice of identifying comers and measuring the quarter
sections. (Transcript, pages 38-54).
If Thompson's record of survey is judicially determined to comply with survey

standards, the Campbells and not the Kvammes would be entitled to summary judgment on
the claim for adverse possession. If there are genuine issues of material fact concerning
Thompson's record of survey, then summary judgment must be denied and the action
proceed to trial. Finally, the evidence shows the Kvammes rented the Campbells' property
for a period of time prior to the filing of this action. As renters, the Kvammes recognized the
Campbells' title and accepted that title without dispute.
Consequently, the record on appeal does not contain sufficient evidence to permit the
appellate court to make the necessary factual determinations needed to sustain the Kvammes'
theories. See Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834, 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009)(the record on
appeal is sufficient to determine whether claims have merit); Eimco Corp. v. Sims, 100 Idaho
390, 598 P.2d 538 (1979).
As noted in the Appellants' Brief, the record of survey performed by Kevin
Thompson is the only record of survey before the district court. If that record of survey is
admissible through the foundation of Kevin Thompson, then the arguments raised by the
Kvammes based on their theory of measurement of a "nominal section" all fail.
To that end, it bears restating the applicable rule. If reasonable people could reach
different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, a motion for
summary judgment must be denied. Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 3 P.3d 51 (2000).
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Boundary by Agreement

For similar reasons as set forth above, the Kvammes' claim of boundary by
agreement likewise cannot be sustained on appeal.
First, the district court did not examine the facts pertaining to the claim of boundary
by agreement to determine whether there were genuine issues of material fact. On appeal, the
appellate court has insufficient record before it to demonstrate conclusively that the
Kvammes have sustained all elements of their claim for boundary by agreement.
Second, the affidavits of Margy Spradling and Jo Le Campbell filed in support of the
Campbells' motion for summary judgment are contested by affidavits filed in support of the
Kvammes' motion. Such contests of facts prevent any court from granting summary
judgment.
Third, the evidence before the district court on summary judgment when viewed most
favorably for the Campbells shows the Campbells and their predecessors in interest knew the
fence line was fifteen feet south of what they knew to be the deeded boundary and they never
agreed that the fence line would be treated as the boundary.
Again, if reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence, a motion for summary judgment must be denied. Kelso v.
Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 3 P.3d 51 (2000).

On appeal, the Kvammes' invitation for the appellate court to become the trial court
should be declined.
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Accordingly, the Kvammes' cross-appeal on the rule of right result-wrong theory
should be denied.
The Kvammes have presented argument or authority for any of the other issues on
appeal they noted in their notice of cross-appeal. Consequently, those issues need not be
considered by the Court on appeal. Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Commerce and Labor, 145
Idaho 415, 179 P.3d 1071 (2008).

C.

The Kvammes' request for attorney fees on appeal should be denied.
On appeal, as in the district court, the Kvammes request an award of attorney fees in

accordance with LC.§ 12-121.
In the event the Court vacates or reverses the district court's denial of the Campbells'
motion for reconsideration and grant of summary judgment, then the Kavammes would not
be the prevailing party and it would not necessary to discuss whether the appeal was brought
or defended unreasonably under LC. § 12-121. Caldwell v. Cornetta, 151 Idaho 34, 41, 253
P.3d 708 (2011).
On appeal, the Campbells presented a legitimate issue for the court to consider. The
district court's determination not to consider the affidavit of Kevin Thompson filed as part of
the Campbells' timely motion for reconsideration raised a genuine issue of abuse of
discretion. Where the district court held the record of survey lacked foundation and, thus, the
Campbells did not sustain their burden, an affidavit that supplies the missing foundation
should be considered in order to reach a fair and just result. Therefore, no fees are available
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8

against a party that presents a legitimate question for the Court to address. Lane Ranch P'ship
v. City ofSun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007).

Furthermore, an award under 12-121 is appropriate when the Court "has the abiding
belief that the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation." BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 355, 63 P.3d 474, 481 (2003).
Despite the accusations lodged by the Kvammes against the Campbells and their counsel, the
Campbells have a solid basis for appeal. They have a survey. It shows they are the owners of
the property in question. The record on appeal shows the Campbells properly posted security
to preserve the award of costs made to the Kvammes while the appeal is pending. Contrary to
assertions made, the Campbells genuinely believe their position has merit and they have not
appealed for the purpose of delaying justice or harassing the Kvammes.
The Kvammes' request for an award of fees on appeal should be denied.

CONCLUSION

The district court abused its discretion m denying the Campbells' motion for
reconsideration.
The record on appeal does not permit the Court to uphold on disputed and nondetermined facts summary judgment for the Kvammes' on their claims of adverse possession
or boundary by agreement.
The district court's order denying the Campbells' motion for reconsideration and its
Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment should be vacated together with
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the subsequent Judgment based on the district court's order. The case should be remanded to
the district court with directions to review the Affidavit of Kevin Thompson and reconsider
the cross motions for summary judgment.
Dated this

--4-

day of November 2012.

Kipp L. Manwaring
Attorney for the Appellants

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

qtb

day of November 2012, a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
copy of the foregoing document was served upon the person or persons named below, in the
manner indicated.
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